Flight OPS

Airbus pilots will find in this Airbus briefing lots of information concerning braking recommendations. This document covers all phases of flight from the preliminary cockpit preparation to the end of of the flight.

Inability to assess or manage the aircraft energy level during the approach often is cited as a causal factor in unstabilized approaches. Either a deficit of energy (being low and/or slow) or an excess of energy (being high and/or fast) may result in approach-and-landing accidents, such as: loss of contro, landing short, hard landing, tail strike; runway excursion and/or runway overrun. This Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Note provides background information and operational guidelines for a better understanding of energy management during intermediate approach and during final approach.

This Airbus Training Aid itself was the basis of the article entitled “Aerodynamic Principles Of Large Aircraft Upsets” that appeared as a Special Edition of FAST in June 1998

The information and techniques presented in this Boeing training aid are aimed at industry solutions for large swept-wing turbofan airplanes typically seating more than 100 passengers.

Other type airplanes may have characteristics that are different and guidance from the manufacturers of these types of airplanes should be followed.

This document is the following of "Airplane Upset Recovery Part 1" training aid.

Updates guidance and research findings boost confidence that airplane upset recovery is on the right track

Autoland systems were developped for landing in fog but since its introduction, use of autoland has been extended into other areas that were not considered at the outset. Operations on contaminated runways are not considered during certification but the case is practically studied. This article has been published for the 10th Performance and Operations Conference in 1998.

This document has been published by the respected and well-known Flight Safety Foundation. Safety can be jeopardized when aircraft deviate from their assigned altitudes. Carefully implemented altitude awareness programs have been adopted by some airlines. These proven programs focus on improving communications, altitude alerter setting procedure, crew prioritization and task allocation, and ensuring correct altimeter settings.

In this document Airbus provides statistics, most common causes, factors affecting the margins, reviews aircraft design features and gives operational recommendations.

Boeing makes here a human factors approach to preventing Tail Strikes. Very interesting document.

This article is a tribute to the DHL Airbus A300 crew who has been hit by a missile while taking off from Baghdad. After having lost hydraulic power, the crew had then to learn how to fly and land an asymmetric aircraft using the only thrust control. Airbus explains this whole incredible and dramatic story.

Although a rare occurrence, a rejected landing is a challenging maneuver decided and conducted in an unanticipated and unprepared manner.

Brake energy limitations may not be common for most operators, and so are not well understood:

• Certification of brakes has changed significantly in recent years

• Misconceptions about brake energy abound

• Incidents associated with high brake energy continue to occur.

Airbus has been asked by some operators to study the case of a circling approach at high altitude airports with one engine failed.This study has shown that the published procedure may not be adequate at high altitude, but also at high temperature.

This Boeing document explains origin of crosswind guidelines and reviews crosswind values, crosswind effects on high by-pass engine airplanes and takeoff and landing techniques.

Operations in crosswind conditions require strict adherence to applicable crosswind limitations or maximum recommended crosswind values, operational recommendations and handling techniques, particularly when operating on wet or contaminated runways.

Inadequate management of descent-and-approach profile and/or incorrect management of aircraft energy level may lead to loss of vertical situational awareness and/or rushed and unstabilized approaches. Either situation increases the risk of approach-and-landing accidents, including those involving CFIT.

Driftdown and Oxygen Procedure and lessons learnt from an arline perspective.

This briefing note is intended to help the reader gain and maintain situational awareness, to prevent falling into the traps associated with the loss of situational awareness and to avoid the adverse effects of the loss of situational awareness on flight safety.

A good understanding of cruise flight can not only help crews operate efficiently and save their companies money, but can also help them deal with low fuel situations. As an additional benefit, the less fuel consumed, the more environmentally friendly the flight.

Every takeoff is an opportunity to save fuel. If each takeoff and climb is performed efficiently, an airline can realize significant savings over time. But what constitutes an efficient takeoff? How should a climb be executed for maximum fuel savings? The most efficient flights actually begin long before the airplane is cleared for takeoff.

The purpose of this document is to provide Airbus pilots with the agreed interpretations of the currently AWO (All Weather Operations) regulations.

This special issue of Flight Safety Digest presents two reports on the experiences of pilots who fly aircraft with “glass cockpits” — that is, modern aircraft with highly automated flight management systems and electronic flight instrument systems. The reports sample the views of line pilots regarding the advantages and disadvantages of flying these advanced-technology aircraft.

In the summer of 1997 there were two accidents, involving the loss of large transport aircraft, which occurred in very heavy rain. The first casualty was a Korean Airlines Boeing 747 which came down on Guam, and the second, a Vietnamese Tupolev in Cambodia. Both aircraft accidents occurred in torrential rain on approach to an airport. Although it may turn out that rain was not a factor in either of these accidents, research indicates that heavy rainfall can have a significant effect on the performance of an aircraft.

Center of gravity (CG) and altitude significantly affect the longitudinal stability of an airplane. An understanding of handling characteristics at various CG positions and altitudes permits flight crews to use proper control inputs when manually flying throughout the flight envelope.

Basic physics makes slippery-runway issues crystal clear!

Boeing has recently published a well illustrated document specific to landing on slippery runways. This document reviews available landing data, certified data, QRH adisory data and many other topics.

This Boeing document is a review of the events leading to, and lessons learnt from the over-run of Quantas B747-400 at Bangkok Thailand, September 23, 1999.

To reduce loss of control accidents, the U.S. government has funded a program to provide airplane-upset-recovery training for 2,000 airline pilots. The training is conducted in an aerobatic single-engine airplane and in a multi-engine jet modified as a variable-stability in-flight simulator.

Right adherence to procedures fo takeof weight, enter of gravity and stabilizer trim setting reduces the likehood of uncommanded or delayed rotation

Boeing asks a very simple question: "how narrow is narrow?"

A very interesting and detailed technical article issued by Airbus.

How to improve Stopping Distances on specifically prepared runways.

The term “optimum use of automation” refers to the integrated and coordinated use of Autopilot / Flight Director, Autothrottle / autothrust, and Flight Management System.

In this briefing, Airbus explains how to determine Landing Distance and approach speed determination in case of an engine failure during approach. It also reviews the case of multiple failures, use of the autopilot and autothrottle. This document contents an exhaustive study on a topic rarely detailed...

This Briefing Note provides an overview of the factors involved in altitude deviations. This document can be used for stand-alone reading or as the basis for the development of an airline’s altitude awareness program.

In recent years, there has been an increase in the incidence of significant structural damage to commercial airplanes from hard nosegear touchdowns. In most cases, the main gear touchdowns were relatively normal. The damage resulted from high nose-down pitch rates generated by full or nearly full forward control column application before nosegear touchdown.

Flight crews need to be aware of the potential for significant structural damage from hard nosegear contact and know which actions to take to prevent such incidents.

The purpose of this Airbus Briefing is to address tailstrikes occurrence at takeoff.

The purpose of this Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Note is to address tailstrike occurrence at landing.

This Flight Operations Review has been initialy published by Boeing in 1986. It discussses the key elements that lead to a good landing.

Pushbacks present a potentially serious hazard to ground personnel. From 1964 through December 1991, a search of the Boeing Product Safety Jet Transport Safety Events data base revealed 31 reported accidents worldwide where personnel were run over by the airplane wheels during the pushback process.

Boeing has developed the Quiet Climb System, an automated avionics feature for quiet procedures that involve thrust cutback after takeoff. By reducing and restoring thrust automatically, the system lessens crew workload and results in a consistently quiet footprint, which helps airlines comply with restrictions and may allow for an increase in takeoff payload.

A rejected landing (also referred to as an aborted landing) is defined as a go-around maneuver initiated after touchdown of the main landing gear or after bouncing. Although a rare occurrence, a rejected landing is a challenging maneuver decided and conducted in an unanticipated and unprepared manner...

This Flight Safety Foundation produced a very good debriefing of an accident which involved a Tower Air 747 classics on takeoff...

This Airbus Briefing Note is primarily designed for aircraft that do not have flight envelope protection (e.g. A300/A310/A300-600). However, the key points at the end of this briefing note are also applicable to all aircraft types, with or without flight envelope protection.

This article reviews the principles of tire traction, landing techniques and the use of brakes, speedbrakes and reverse thrust to stop the airplane during landing...

Flight crews primarily use their judgment to identify and report hard landings, but recorded flight data also might be useful to gauge the severity of the impact before a conditional maintenance inspection is performed. The accident record shows that hard landings often involve substantial damage and sometimes result in fatalities.

A high speed rejected takeoff during the takeoff roll. The decision on whether or not to perform a rejected takeoff -specifically, on whether or not to STOP or GO- requires comprehensive flight crew awareness of the many risks involved. The aim of this Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Note is, therefore, to review the STOP or GO decision-making process, and the associated operational and prevention strategies to be applied, in order to limit the risks of taking inappropriate actions and unsafe decisions.

This interesting Boeing document reviews causes and prevention, training recommendations and preventive measures to avoid tailstrikes in strong gusty winds.

There have been a number of accidents related to take-off in conditions in which snow and/or other forms of freezing precipitation were falling while the aircraft was on the ground preparing for departure. While there is no doubt that air crew have a clear understanding of the legal and airline requirement for "clean" aircraft prior to departure, there are times when pilots must exercise their judgment in determining whether or not small accumulations on the wings or other aerodynamic surfaces constitute accumulations which may have an impact on the aerodynamic performance of the aircraft. This article provides additional information on the performance and handling of the aircraft with contamination on the wings and other flying surfaces to assist pilots in making these critical go/ no-go decisions.

This Airbus production reviews some rotation flying techniques and is written as a reminder of various recommendations. This document is specific to Airbus pilots.

Airframe manufacturers, airlines,pilot groups, and government andregulatoryagencies, have developed this training resource dedicated to reducing the number of rejected takeoff (RTO) accidents.

Airbus Recommendations.

Taxi incidents are usually perceived to be less dangerous than incidents in flight,but they may cost a lot of money! This Airbus document reviews some safety precautions specific to Airbus aircraft, pushback and taxi techniques (One-Engine Taxi - A340 Two Engines), powerpush, taxi with Deflated Tires, etc.

Carbon brakes are now standard equipment on the Boeing 747-400, 757/767 and 777.The use of these brakes provides a substantial reduction in airplane operating empty weight, but in-service experience has generally shown lower brake life than originally expected. Analysis has revealed a difference between the wear characteristics of carbon versus steel brakes. It is believed that improvements in carbon brake life can be achieved through better understanding of the operational factors affecting carbon brake life.

Airframe manufacturers, airlines,pilot groups, and government andregulatoryagencies, have developed this training resource dedicated to reducing the number of rejected takeoff (RTO) accidents.

Recall of the last procedure enhancements.

On February 8th, 2002, The National Transportation safety Board (NTSB) in cooperation with the French "Bureau Enquetes Accidents" (BEA) issued recommendations that aircraft manufacturers re-emphazise the structural certification requirements for the rudder and vertical stabilizer, showing how some maneuvers can result in exceeding limits and even load to structural failure. The purpose of this Airbus FCOM Bulletin is to re-emphazise proper operational use of the rudder, highlight certification requirements and rudder control design characteristics.

As the computer technology of aircraft navigation systems became more and more sophisticated, aircraft and avionics manufacturers attempt to exploit this computer capability in aircraft operations. One of the most profound capabilities being exploited recently is the aircraft’s capability of navigating vertically on an instrument approach without reference to an external electronic guidance signal such as an ILS glideslope or MLS elevation signal. This mode of operation is called “VNAV”. The vertical guidance is usually based on barometric altimetry augmented with information from a mix of navigation sensors. Vertical command information may be retrieved from the aircraft’s aeronautical information database or from the pilot’s input into the Flight Management System (FMS). Vertical command information while conducting VNAV on a conventional non-precision approach is normally retrieved entirely from the aircraft’s aeronautical database.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Regulations and the European Joint Aviation Requirements redefined V1 as the maximum airspeed at which a flight crew must take the first action to safely reject a takeoff. Other revisions change the method of compensating for the time required by pilots to take action to reject a takeoff; require accelerate-stop data based on airplanes with fully worn brakes; and require wet-runway takeoff-performance data in airplane flight manuals.

A surprising number of aircraft accidents have occurred during visual approaches or during the visual segment following an instrument approach. An interesting review initiated by Captain Fred H. LORENZ has been published sometime ago…

The objective of this briefing is to provide information to help recognize the factors that increase the risk of a wake vortex encounter, Flying techniques to avoid wake turbulence and the information to help recognize the effects of wake turbulence.

Plan to avoid the rocks during an emergency descent.

Many rejected take-off accidents occurred before closer examination of the certification criteria revealed some of the shortcomings. A number of pilots had possibly believed that they were within the certification criteria to reject a takeoff, but according to an FAA test pilot, icing certification should be considered as a licence to fly through, rather than in icing conditions...

Southwest engineer gives operator perspective on blended winglet.

Blended winglets on the Boeing Business Jet and the B737-800 commercial airplane offer operational benefits to customers. Besides giving the airplanes a distinctive appearance, the winglets create more efficient flight characteristics in cruise and during takeoff and climbout, which translate into additional range with the same fuel and payload.

This Boeing document will help you to understand better the Center Of Gravity Limitations.

Barometric altimeters on modern aircraft with digital Air Data Computers are very accurate most of the time and we rely on these altimeters in every aspect of today’s air travel. We diligently set the local altimeter settings prior to each takeoff and each approach but we do not routinely make any corrections for non-standard temperatures. This FSF document explains the chilling result of cold temperatures on barometric altimeters.

This Boeing document will help you to increase your knowledge in a better understanding of contaminated & slippery runway operations.

A UPS captain explains the operational aspects of CDAs or Continuous Descent Arrivals.

A perspective to get started with dignified Cost Index Values...

This Boeing document is an excellent briefing on deicing/anti-icing fluids. A must to know...

This Rolls Royce document answers to frequent asked questions on Derated Climb Performance:

What determines climb rating, the effects on airplane perfomance, engine benefits from derate and many other interesting topics.

The determination of Dispatch Takeoff Weight seems to be quite easy: start with the empty weight of the airplane and add the weight. But is it always that straightforward? Is everything actually wihed prior to the flight? How is the airplane empty weight determined? This Boeing document is a very well done brochure.

The Effect of ZFW / ZFWCG on Airbus Operations.

Airbus presents New Derated and Flexible Takeoff Thrust for up to 40% thrust reduction.

Operators have reported the use of excessively low takeoff reference speeds that have resulted in tail strike, high-speed rejected takeoffs (RTO), and other instances of degraded performance. These incidents were caused by a variety of human errors that typically resulted from using an erroneously low value for gross weight or an incorrect flap reference setting when determining takeoff speeds. This document is published by Boeing and it is well illustrated.

Flex/Derate, Engine bump and derated climb specific to Airbus aircraft.

Boeing reviews the philosophy of Fuel Conservation: Fuel conservation means managing the operation & condition of an airplane to minimize fuel used on every flight!

A very interesting document published by All Nippon Airways and dealing with different possibilities to optimize the reserve fuel.

Boeing publication reviewing during the 2006 Operators Symposium all the possible solutions to manage fuel consumption.

Today's tough competitive environment forces airlines to reduce their operational costs in every facet of their business. All ways and means to achieve this goal have to be rationally envisaged, safety being of course the prime factor in any airline operation. A wide variety of different aspects have to be taken into consideration in this process, such as airline economics, airline management, flight operations, maintenance management, technical condition of aircraft. The purpose of this document is to examine the influence of the latter with respect to aerodynamic deterioration.

This Airbus document provides reminders on aerodynamics, flight mechanics, altimetry, influence of external parameters on aircraft performance, flight optimization concepts, etc. Great information...

This brochure provides an overview of the flying techniques and operational aspects involved in approach-and-landing accidents.

The purpose of this document is to provide Airbus operators with an understanding of Airbus aircraft operations in cold weather conditions, and address such aspects as aircraft contamination, performance on contaminated runways, fuel freezing limitations and altimeter corrections.

There is nothing to add: everything is the main title!

The purpose of this brochure is to provide airline flight operations with some recommendations on the way to regularly monitor their aircraft performance. This brochure was designed to provide guidelines for aircraft performance monitoring based on the feedback obtained from many operators and on the knowledge of Airbus aircraft and systems.

Today's tough competitive environment forces airlines to consider operational costs in every facet of their business. All ways and means to achieve this goal have to be rationally envisaged, safety being of course the prime factor in any airline operation. A wide spectrum of considerations intervene in this process stemming from airline economics, marketing management, crew scheduling, flight operations, engineering and maintenance management, technical condition of aircraft. The idea behind this document is to revisit the cost index concept with a view towards balancing both fuel- and time-related costs.

This material describes the cargo loading areas on Airbus aircraft and the systems related to cargo holds.

This Boeing document provides a brief introduction to aviation fuel definitions and characteristics, familiarizes you with terminology and industry jargon,addresses operational concerns related to fuel, and exchanges some insight into the energy of flight.

Basics, principles of operations and a new software tool for operational predictions

Operators typically purchase twin-aisle airplanes for long-distance flights. However, when market conditions dictate, operators may use some of these airplanes on shorter flights. In such instances, appropriate action by the flight crew can reduce the likelihood of brake overheating and concomitant departure delays.

One of the very best documents published by Boeing on a very sensitive operational topic.

When an aircraft is dispatched in accordance with certification and operational regulations, there are some inherent margins included in the calculated takeoff and landing performance. Although it is not permitted to take advantage of these margins in order to increase the aircraft performance limit weight, it is of interest to be aware of the magnitude of these margins.

This briefing quantifies some of the margins in accelerate-stop distance, takeoff distance, minimum rate of climb, obstacle clearance, and landing distance on a 737-800, 747-400, and 777-200.

How to optimize Takeoff performance? This document has been published by Airbus for the 14th Performance & Operations Conference.

Recommendations For De-Icing and Anti-Icing published by the AEA (Association Of European Airlines). The AEA De-icing/Anti-icing Working Group is the European focal point for the continuous development of safe, economical and environmentally friendly standards and procedures for the deicing/anti-icing of aircraft on the ground in conjunction with related international standards

organizations.

Topics of discussion are numerous: benefits of using Reduced Thrust, Methods for Reduced Takeoff Thrust, Regulatory requirements, thrust effect on takeoff performance, assumed temperature method. This is an exhaustive brochure.

This SAS Braathens document has been published by Boeing during one of its latest symposiums. Once again it is well illustrated and quite interesting to read.

Most current performance requirements for the certification and operation of transport category airplanes were established at the beginning of the jet age. Today, operating experience and data provide the most accurate means to further improve the performance requirements of modern transport airplanes.

Reminders on Airbus recommendations.

Takeoff Thrust Setting Review for Airbus Operators.

This document will help you to understand the whole process of ice accretion and the consecutive dangers.

What is Improved Climb? How is Improved Climb used? Explore in this Boeing document all the operational considerations of "improving" climb performance

Boeing goes well beyond the idea that V1 is the speed at which the takeoff should be continued unless the stopping maneuver has already been initiated.

The objective of this Briefing is to provide, from an operational perspective, an overall review of takeoff speeds, and of the factors that affect the calculation and use of V speeds.

This well-illustrated document to help pilots to understand different takoff thrust setting techniques.

Since the early days of flight, angle of attack (AOA) has been a key aeronauticalengineering parameter and is fundamental to understanding many aspects of airplane performance, stability, and control. Virtually any book on these subjects, as well as basic texts and instructional material written for flight crews, defines AOA and discusses its many attributes...

This Boeing article deals again with Angle of attack (AOA) which is an aerodynamic parameter that is key to understanding the limits of airplane performance. Recent accidents and incidents have resulted in new flight crew training programs, which in turn have raised interest in AOA in commercial aviation. Awareness of AOA is vitally important as the airplane nears stall. It is less useful to the flight crew in the normal operational range. On most Boeing models currently in production, AOA information is presented in several ways: stick shaker, airspeed tape, and pitch limit indicator. Boeing has also developed a dedicated AOA indicator integral to the flight crew’s primary flight displays.

Another well detailed document explaining the winglets philosophy.

This Boeing document reviews the importance of V1, statistics of past Rejected Takeoff (RTO) accidents and incidents and tries to provide an appropriate education for a better "Go/no Go" decision.

The Vortex Generators have been installed and utilized on most of commercial aircraft to enhance flying qualities, but each application has its own story...

Turbulence has been known since the early days of aviation. The introduction of wide-body aircraft and the wake turbulence associated with their heavy weights, an increase of air traffic and safety concerns, prompted industry and government interest. Much investigation and analysis was done by Boeing and other agencies in the 1960s and 1970s. It was during this time when some ground rules, or to be more precise, air rules were established so that this usually invisible hazard could be avoided. What are the wake turbulence issues is one of questions asked in this very interesting Airliner document

What is a Wet runway? Ask around you and you should be surprised of some answers. This Boeing document explains the hidden side of the wet runway concept...

Wingtip Devices: what they do and how they do it. A Boeing aerodynamist explains in very simple words what is hidden between "induced drag reduction", "vortex", "winglets" and so on.

Although small amounts of stress can yield benefits such as increased alertness and an improved ability to concentrate, an accumulation of stress caused by daily frustration and major life events has been associated with numerous health problems. In studies of flight crewmembers, stress has been associated with pilot error.

Studies have found no link between cabin air quality and health problems, but some crewmembers and passengers say those studies are wrong.

New methods of examining recorded voice communications can help investigators evaluate interactions between flight crewmembers and determine the quality of the work environment on the flight deck.

Australian researchers found that pilots who took prescribed antidepressants were no more likely than others to be involved in accidents and incidents.

Mistakes in determining takeoff parameters are frequent, a french study says, and methods of detecting them are not always effective.

Despite years of emphasis, some fundamental problems still plague crew interaction, suggesting additional focus on monitoring and challenging could yield safety benefits.

A cognitive engineering analysis of the Flight Management System (FMS) Vertical Navigation (VNAV) function has identified overloading of the VNAV button and overloading of the Flight Mode Annunciation (FMA) used by the VNAV function.

Using good communication skills with your passengers can vastly improve satisfaction, and may even put anxious fliers at ease.

This Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Note provides generic guidelines for conducting effective and productive briefings. Effective briefings should be short, structured, concise and adapted to the particular conditions of the takeoff or approach-and-landing. The information provided in this document has been expanded on purpose to provide an opportunity to review and discuss in details each briefing item.

This Airbus document provides a practical set of recommendations for the use of longrange crewmembers: alertness decrement, sleep, napping,life hygiene. During long-haul rotations, partial or complete compliance with these recommendations should allow pilots to better manage their levels of alertness in flight, limit sleep loss related to night flights, facilitate, if applicable, adaptation to local layover times, depending on time zone differences. The choice of recommendations will of course have to be adapted to the circumstances. Partial reliance on these recommendations is therefore also acceptable.

After two years of workshop discussions and follow-up meetings, recommendations have been issued for planning and approving flight-sector lengths greater than 16 hours between specific city pairs. Specialists at these meetings forged operational guidelines that will help the airline industry to expand the operational envelope while maintaining safety.

Incidents and accidents involve the entire range of CRM and Human Factors aspects. In incident and accident reports, the flight crew’s contribution often is considered to be just what the flight crew did or did not do. This briefing is a focused but limited overview of the broad CRM subject.

The importance of procedures and the adherence to procedures cannot be overstated.

Dehydratation causes an insidious degradation of pilot performance that must not be lightly regarded.

Communications between controllers and pilots can be improved by the mutual understanding of each other’s operating environment.

Safety problems can arise from insufficient monitoring by the flight crew. Monitoring can be degraded because of several factors, including preoccupation with other duties.

Nevertheless, monitoring can be improved through policy changes and crewmember training.

Information or training alone cannot immunize a person or an organization against error. Improvement is only achieved through concrete improvements that make errors less probable and their consequences less severe.

This Briefing provides an overview and discussion of Criteria defining a stabilized approach and, factors involved in rushed and unstabilized approaches.

This training manual was produced by Western Michigan University’s School of Aviation Sciences and Battelle Memorial Institute with assistance from Alaska Airlines and the office of the Chief Scientific and Technical Advisor for Human Factors to the Federal Aviation Administration. It is a continuation of the project to identify leadership and followership skills used in CRM, and builds on the previous published manual “Cockpit Leadership and Followership Skills: Theoretical Perspectives and Training Guidelines,”

An effective crew briefing is an opportunity to transform a group of individuals into a highly effective team

This Airbus document provides a practical set of recommendations for the use of long range crewmembers

The operations Golden Rules defined by Airbus assist trainees in maintaining their basic airmanship as they progress to increasingly integrated and automated aircraft models.

Most of us will go through our entire careers without ever having to declare an emergency. For those who do pull the short straw however, there are some basic considerations that apply, regardless of the specific problem(s). The desired outcome for any emergency situation is a controlled rate of descent onto a prepared surface.

In the wake of the Swissair MD-11 crash, the two largest operators of MD-11s in the U.S. are instructing pilots to land quickly if they smell smoke or encounter major electrical problems. Delta and FedEx have put out the word to "land now, troubleshoot later." The FAA has urged since 1980 that pilots smelling smoke should get on the ground as soon as possible...

This Airbus Flight Operations Briefing Note provides a summary of human factors issues identified in incidents and accidents. This summary may be used either to assess: the company exposure and develop corresponding prevention strategies,or the reader’s individual exposure and develop corresponding personal lines-of-defense. Ultimately, human factors are involved in all incidents and accidents. Whether crew-related, ATC-related, maintenance-related, organization-related or design-related, each link of the safety chain involves human beings and, therefore, human decisions and potential human errors...

RNAV and RNP procedures have increased the importance of some tasks performed by pilots and have also introduced some new ones. Pilots must allow adequate time to properly load and brief their SID, STAR, and approach charts. While containing many elements common with existing procedures, these procedures can be more detailed than their conventional counterparts. Considering the increased reliance on the FMS for RNAV and RNP procedures, airlines may benefit from reviewing their training programs and ensuring that they meet pilot workload and situation awareness demands.

This briefing provides a summary of human factors issues identified in incidents and accidents. It may be used either to assess the company exposure and develop corresponding prevention strategies, or, the reader’s individual exposure and develop corresponding personal lines-of-defense.

The task report presented herewith was undertaken by Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) and The European Association of Aerospace Industries (AECMA) at the request of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in response to a U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendation arising from the 13 December 1994 turboprop-airplane accident at Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina, U.S., which resulted in fatal injuries to 13 passengers and two crewmembers. The NTSB findings in this event strongly suggested that a warning light intended to indicate the activation of a recovery function was falsely interpreted as an engine failure and led to inappropriate crew action. The FAA recognized that there were additional data suggesting that this accident was one of a number of similar accidents, and that a study would be appropriate to look into all commercial transport accident histories where an inappropriate crew action may have been taken in response to what should have been a benign propulsion system malfunction.

Aviation's worst disaster, the terrible KLM / Pan Am accident at Tenerife,, was due in great part to schedule pressure p r o b I e m s experienced by both flight crews. The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) conducted an eighteen month, three country investigation of this accident, with an emphasis on the human factors of flight crew performance, ALPA found that the KLM crew had strong concerns relating to duty time, specifically that they would be able to return to Amsterdam that evening and remain within their duty time regulations. They also expressed concern about the weather and its potential to delay the impending take-off. The cockpit voice recorder indicated the KLM captain said, "Hurry, or else it [the weather] will close again completely".

Exposure to loud noises during flight operations and while off duty compounds the risk, but earplugs and headsets help counteract hearing loss.

Examining communication between flight crew members & their interface with ATC provides a framework from which the underlying causes of listening and dialogue errors can be described and improvement strategies mapped out.

An interesting study published by Department of Cognitive Science University of California San Diego

In 1991, BASI (The Bureau of Air Safety Investigation) published a research report titled, Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle. This report concluded that "the see-and-avoid principle, In the absence of traffic alerts, is subject to serious limitations". Unalerted see-and-avoid has a "limited place as a last resort means of traffic separation at low closing speeds, and is completely unsuitable as primary traffic separation for scheduled services". This report highlighted the fact that "many of the limitations of see-and avoid are associated with physical limits and human perception", and encouraged pilots to be, "made aware of the limitations of the see-and-avoid procedure, particularly the factors which can reduce a pilot's effective visual field".

Although data are not available on flight crewmembers with lower back pain, the numbers presumably are similar to those for the general population, and several studies — primarily involving flight crewmembers on military helicopters — have attempted to gauge the frequency of back pain among pilots.

The omission of an action or an inappropriate action is the most frequent causal factor in incidents and accidents. Interruptions and distractions occur frequently. Some cannot be avoided, some can be minimized or eliminated.

Aviation professionals — pilots, flight attendants, maintenance technicians, air traffic control personnel and others — can adopt sound sleep practices to counteract sleepiness at work, improve performance and reduce safety risks by understanding factors that affect human ability to sleep during the day and to work at night.

This presentation provides an overview of the prevention strategies and personal lines-of-defense related to runway overruns. It is intended to enhance the reader's awareness but it shall not supersede the applicable regulations or airline's operational documentation.

The mercury's rising, summer's promise is becoming a reality and you're looking forward to some relaxed flying in the lazy, hazy months. In anticipation of summer, flight crews brush up on an assortment of operating concerns, but often ignored is how the human body performs in our thermal environment. High ambient temperatures and other performance factors affect it in much the same manner as an aircraft.

When a pilot becomes tired, problem-solving slows, motor skills degrade and attentiveness is impaired. Many accident-causing human errors are probably the result of pilot fatigue.

Aviation can be a noisy business that can assault tour ears and chip away at your ability to hear clearly. Prevention is your only effective defense.

espite lessons drawn from cockpit resource management programs, the language of the flight deck varies by the seat being occupied - and peril can hide in the syntax. We need new rules of speech.

Eye function and eye-brain coordination are not naturally optimized for visual searches in airspace. But experimental evidence shows that pilots can train themselves in techniques for more effective visual detection of traffic.

Flight crews and cabin crews should take precautions against exposure to the ultraviolet rays in sunlight while on airport ramps and during layovers.

Voluntary safey reports by flight attendants prove to be more valuable than expected.

Standard phraseology is essential to ensure effective crew communication, particularly in today’s operating environment. Standard calls are intended and designed to enhance the efficiency of crew coordination and update the flightcrew situational awareness (e.g., including aircraft position, altitude, speed, status and operation of aircraft systems, …).

Strict adherence to suitable standard operating procedures (SOPs) and normal checklists is an effective method to prevent or mitigate crew errors, anticipate or manage operational threats; and enhance ground / flight operations safety.

Relaxation strategies, including “sleep hygiene” — regular bedtime rituals that help put the mind at ease — are useful for many. And the environment in which sleep takes place can make a large difference, for good or bad. Exercise and diet can also play an important role in obtaining restful sleep.

The immediate donning of oxygen masks by the flight crew is the essential first step after an airplane loses cabin pressure at a high altitude.

"Black hole" approaches posed a significant hazard to airlines during the 1970s. Since then, a number of advances - ground proximity warning systems, the successful push to have VASI and ILS systems installed on more air carrier runways, and head-up displays - have greatly reduced the incidence of "black hole" approach incidents and accidents among carriers flying large jet aircraft. Pilots of regional airlines, however, typically fly more total approaches, more "black hole" approaches, and more approaches to runways without vertical guidance. All pilots may benefit from this review of "black hole" approaches - especially the explanation of why pilots may be lured into flying into terrain or obstacles despite having the runway in sight throughout the approach.

n 1981, additional U.S. Federal Aviation Administration Regulations were enacted to reduce accidents by prohibiting non-essential crew activities during critical phases of flight. A recent review of anonymous reports suggests that non-compliance remains a problem.

Some years ago, there have been two very serious airplane accidents which were caused by the flight crew attempting to takeoff with the wing flaps retracted. There are, of course, many examples of improper use of checklists related in this very interesting document...

Poor cockpit discipline, nonstandard phraseology and poor radio communications technique, nonadherence to company procedures, limited crew experience and inadequate training were among the facts cited in the Portuguese controlled-flight-into-terrain accident report.

Human error has been documented as a primary contributor to more than 70 percent of commercial airplane hull-loss accidents. While typically associated with flight operations, human error has also recently become a major concern in maintenance practices and air traffic management. Boeing human factors professionals work with engineers, pilots, and mechanics to apply the latest knowledge about the interface between human performance and commercial airplanes to help operators improve safety and efficiency in their daily operations.

Regulators see a large role for non traditional methods of miigating fatigue and preventing fatigue- related accidents.

This report examines and details the activities of a major U.S. airline during the period of late 1993 to late 1997, as it acquired two fleets of advanced-technology aircraft, the Boeing 757 and the 737-500. This is a very interesting study with still valid findings today.

Unruly passenger behavior continues to be one of the biggest issues facing airlines and the severity of the problem continues to increase. Although much has been said about dealing with these cases there has been little reference to the causes. Sarah-Jane Prew, the publisher of "Cabin Safety Update" examines some of the factors involved and talks about how cabin crew can identify at an early stage when all is not right.

What makes a pilot "street smart" about flying? By "street smart" we mean: awareness of the essential aspects of flying; ability to know where and when to find critical information; ability to detect and compensate for the mistakes of others; ability to avoid the subtle traps and pitfalls found in the flying environment; and ability to complete a 30-year career without any accidents or serious incidents. Thousands of pilots do this each year - complete a very successful 30-year career without a single incident or accident. Is this just luck, or are there specific identifiable reasons for these superb records?

Miscommunication arising from spoken interaction is a fact of life experienced, in one form or another, almost daily. Even two people speaking face-to-face, ostensibly in the same language, with a common background in the subject of the communication, frequently discover that what was meant was not what was understood. In casual discussion or routine business situations, the results of such miscommunication can range from amusement to expensive errors. But in aviation, the outcome of spoken miscommunication can be deadly. In no area is this more true than in pilot-Air Traffic Control (ATC) interaction.